The conflict in Ukraine has raised concerns in Africa, as the continent could be impacted on several fronts, including a rise in oil prices, the rise in the price of a number of agricultural and mineral commodities, as well as the decrease in the volume of trade with Russia due to Western sanctions. The war in Ukraine could also lead to a reduction in number of the personnel deployed by private Russian military companies to various countries in Africa. Moreover, Africans being evacuated from Ukraine have been subjected to what they consider as racist treatment, particularly at the borders of the countries west of Ukraine. It remains difficult to ascertain the full impact of the conflict on Africa, as it remains unclear if these developments, which give only partial indications of the crisis trajectory, will in fact become established on the long term. However, African reactions to the Ukraine crisis have revealed a number of new realities on the continent, including:
International Competition in Africa has become more complex: It has become clear that there is a need to approach the continent with a new perspective, as the continent is no longer divided into different spheres of interest aligned with global powers as it was during the Cold War era. Although Russian presence in Africa has slowly increased since Putin was re-elected in 2012, it cannot be compared to the level of Soviet presence, either quantitively, in terms of the number of military bases and the size of economic ties, or qualitatively, in terms of political influence, and the adoption of African elites, as well as African publics, of the Soviet ideological and cultural model.
The widespread Chinese presence on the African continent, especially on the economic level, has created a structurally different environment to the Cold War era, which now allows African countries a wider margin of maneuverability when it comes to forming partnerships and alliances with global powers. Moreover, there are now an unprecedented number of middle powers also competing on the African scene, unlike the period of the cold war. These middle powers are now enjoying exceptional privileges, including establishing military bases and the ability to influence political developments, as well as establishing lucrative economic partnerships. This large number of new players has imposed a radically different logic of internal competition on the continent, which is both more complex and more flexible. This allows African countries to exchange one international power for another, or to create a web of partnerships with several partners, which could allow them to maximize gains and minimize costs.
Africa has become more Independent: The Ukrainian conflict has shown that Russia has been unable to translate its growing presence in Africa over the last ten years into political influence that could shape the behavior of African states in relation to an issue that is a vital priority to Russia. A discrepancy can be noticed between Russia’s footprint on the continent and the way African countries voted on the General Assembly 2nd of March resolution condemning the Russian invasion. It was noteworthy that Eretria was the only African country to vote against the resolution, while many African countries chose to absent themselves on the day, or to abstain from voting, including countries that have close relations with Russia, in the form of arms deals and economic cooperation, such as Algeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Angola. More significantly, some African countries, that have signed military protocols with Russia, chose to support the resolution, including Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Botswana, and Zambia. This goes to show that African states do not automatically align with the powers with which they have common interests.
A potentially stronger African voice on the global stage: While the conflict in Ukraine is primarily European, it is open to influence from many sources, one of which could be Africa, which enjoys a number of assets to give it influence on the global stage. For example, the continent could play an important role as an alternative source of energy for Europe, replacing Russia. Africa also controls several key waterways that are pivotal for international commerce. African countries could also become players regarding international security if they enter into new security arrangements that do not only include African parties but extend to international powers as well. Moreover, Africa remains a pivotal player when it comes to trends of international migration, an issue which has also become an important aspect of the Ukraine crisis.
However, these African assets are undermined by several structural weaknesses that hinder Africa’s ability to fulfill its potential, and may even have extremely negative consequences, including:
Lack of coordination: African responses to the Ukrainian conflict have revealed a weakness in coordination, whereby each country voted on the basis of a narrow national perspective, rather than trying to develop a joint stance. This has been a recurring phenomenon since African countries gained their independence, with very rare exceptions. This reflects an inability to coordinate, or perhaps the absence of any will do so on the part of African countries. This was made clear by the radical difference in the stances of four important and influential African countries regarding the General Assembly resolution on Ukraine. Nigeria supported the resolution, South Africa and Algeria abstained and Ethiopia missed the vote on purpose, although the four countries had signed, only two weeks previously, the declaration establishing the “G4 Group”. The group, including Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, and Ethiopia, was established to facilitate consultation and coordination on African issues, and to adopt a unified position in international forums, especially the United Nations. Therefore, the chances of building a united African position to the current Ukrainian conflict appear slim, which will weaken Africa’s ability to impact the developments of the crisis, or benefit from the opportunities they present.
Increased Polarization in some Regions in Africa: Another of the restrictions that could affect Africa’s ability to benefit from the current change of events on the global stage, is the increased polarization and differences that are arising in various regions of Africa. In north Africa, Algeria is the strongest ally of Russia and is the number one purchaser of Russian military hardware and has a long history of relations with Russia. With that in mind, reducing Russian influence in north Africa is a key objective for NATO. Russia has also been able in the last couple of years to secure a role in the Libyan conflict and a key one for that matter, in reaching an end to the conflict there.
With this aim in mind, reducing Russia’s presence is becoming critical for NATO. Russia is also seeking to expand its presence in the horn of Africa and on the east African coastline. This was affirmed further by the visit of Mohamed Hamiditi to Moscow in the days following the Ukrainian invasion raising the stakes further of polarizing the entire continent. Given the fact that the region of east Africa is witnessing such as in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan from huge political crises.
The impact of international polarization: Africa, especially North Africa and the Horn of Africa, could be negatively impacted by the atmosphere of international polarization and tensions resulting from the confrontation in Ukraine. For example, Russia has strong and long term relations with Algeria, and is the primary recipient of Russian arms on the continent. Russia has also established presence and influence in Libya. NATO countries are likely to make reducing this Russian presence in North Africa a strategic objective. This is likely to inflame tensions in this region, both between countries, and among various factions within one country.
In a similar vein, it seems highly likely that polarization will extend to the Horn of Africa region, as Russia has been making persistent efforts to establish a presence on the continent’s eastern coastline. This was illustrated by the visit of a senior Sudanese official to Russia in the days following the outbreak of the Ukraine war.
The potential return of conventional war: The use of force to change established borders in the case of Ukraine could provide an unfortunate precedent for similar action in Africa, where there are multiple disputes over borders. In East Africa, for example, there have been repeated clashes between Sudanese and Ethiopian forces stationed in El Fashaka area. There is also an ongoing dispute over sea borders between Kenya and Somalia, even after the ICJ issued its ruling on the matter in Somalia’s favor. Adding fuel to the fire are arms acquisition by many African states in the last few years, for which Russia was primarily responsible. This may encourage some African countries to resort to force to resolve differences, which would undermine the fragile peace on the African continent.
It is likely that the conflict in eastern Europe will usher in new rules for Africa’s engagement on the global stage, which will be fundamentally different from those established following the end of the Cold War, which marginalized Africa. However, Africa’s ability to play a bigger role on the global stage remains dependent on the ability of African countries to overcome structural weaknesses, and to protect themselves from the adverse consequences of rapidly changing global conditions.