When official negotiations between parties end without a resolution, it becomes futile to continue with the same negotiation method. Persisting may carry a political cost among supporters, voters, or opponents at home. It may also lead to a recycling of suggestions, looping around the same positions rather than the interests at hand, resulting in wasted time and effort. Additionally, developments on the ground may maximize the gains of one party at the expense of the other. The last resort after failed negotiations would be war, or other political means. To avoid armed conflict and its consequent humanitarian and economic repercussions, Track Two Diplomacy is a viable option.
What is Track Two Diplomacy?
Track Two Diplomacy is usually defined as informal, non-governmental interaction between conflicting groups or countries for the purpose of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and producing objective content in a way that can help resolve an existing or potential conflict. The term was first coined by American diplomat Joseph Montville in 1981 to define informal dialogues in the negotiation process. If official diplomacy is often referred to as Track One Diplomacy, then informal diplomacy is referred to as Track Two Diplomacy, while Track One and Half Diplomacy falls between both. It is important to note that Track Two Diplomacy is not an alternative to Track One Diplomacy, but complementary to it.
Race Against Time with the “Hard” Option
Conflict resolution literature often refers to two types of Track Two Diplomacy. The first, Soft Track Two Diplomacy, helps create a space for interaction between conflicting parties to strengthen or build relationships, break psychological barriers, and overcome any preconceived notions about the other party. It also helps to build an understanding of the opponent’s position so they can build common narratives without being bound by the need to come up with a conclusion.
The second type is Hard Track Two Diplomacy, which is the main focus of this analysis as it takes into account the limited time available before military intervention after all official negotiation attempts have been exhausted. This type relies on inviting influential informal individuals or experts from the two conflicting sides to meet within a semi-confidential framework and under the auspices of a third party or non-governmental mediator. The objective here is to produce practical proposals and solutions that can be built upon by formal negotiations in order to settle the conflict. The implementation of this is facilitated or mediated by conflict resolution or academic practitioners, former diplomats, academics, political psychologists, etc. The Oslo negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis are a successful example of Hard Track Two Diplomacy, where favourable outcomes were produced for both parties.
The Recipe for Success
The chances of success of Track Two Diplomacy depend on a set of factors related to the details of the negotiation process itself or the actors (mediators and/or participants) involved. For example, relevant literature highlights elements such as the mediator’s integrity and honesty, the degree to which they rely on a theory that may guide their mission and knowledge of the conflict, the timing of the intervention, and the willingness of the mediator and participants to risk failure or accusation by the public of easily giving in to the opponent.
This is in addition to factors related to the selection of the participants involved, and the extent to which they are able to communicate with official tracks in their respective countries and convey the results of the negotiations. It is also worth mentioning the importance of the facilitator’s ability to devise creative proposals and new, unconventional solutions, the criteria and roles defined by the facilitator, coordination between the two tracks of diplomacy (Fischer 2006), and efficiency and effectiveness when it comes to communicating negotiation outcomes.
Timing
Despite the controversy over the optimal timing for the intervention of Track Two Diplomacy in conflict resolution literature, there is a common agreement that there is a ripe moment, when the two conflicting parties realize that the conflict has exhausted them, and that continued escalation would lead to more losses, without the ability to resolve the conflict for either side. Furthermore, the repercussions of the military option are too costly. However, another point of view states that the matter does not depend on the moment of maturity of the conflict as much as the availability of a real moment of readiness on the part of the conflicting parties, to search for a way to reconstruct the conflict in a way that may result in progress. Others believe that the optimal timing for Track Two Diplomacy is simultaneously with Track One Diplomacy or when the diplomatic parties reach a roadblock during negotiations that cannot be overcome.
The Transfer of Outcomes
The transfer process is defined as the process by which the results are passed from Track Two to Track One and the decision-making center. Results are divided into two types: individual changes, such as improved attitudes and new perceptions of conflict, and collective changes such as the negotiated frameworks and resolution principles that are formulated and agreed upon. In other words, Track Two participants first need to change their views on the conflict, then produce resolution options. Ultimately, these ideas are “transferred” to the leaders and official negotiators. The literature indicates that the more the participants are able to communicate with official channels, the more likely they will influence the future of the conflict.
Limitations and Challenges
Although an opportunity to succeed where the official negotiation failed, Track Two Diplomacy comes with a number of weaknesses and limitations. The first is the need for special participants and negotiators. Choosing a competent and flexible individual who possesses political and technical knowledge and is able to produce creative ideas does not necessarily mean that they are able to communicate the outcomes of the negotiation to the relevant political authority. The opposite is also true, where the chosen individual may have a solid relationship with the relevant authorities but lack flexibility, creative thinking, and the technical background required if the conflict has technical dimensions.
Secondly, Track Two negotiations can be lengthy in producing results when there is no political or moral obligation for official parties to change the balance of power on the ground, resulting in no significant changes in the conflict resolution process. Additionally, unlike formal negotiations, Track Two negotiators lack the necessary resources and tools to constantly pressure their partners during and after the negotiation process to implement agreements. Track Two Diplomacy also depends on the extent to which the official political systems in the two conflicting countries are open to political action from outside official circles. Even in the most democratic systems, there may be laws that criminalize communication with certain entities through unofficial government channels. Furthermore, the parties involved in Track Two Diplomacy are not, in most cases, held accountable to the public or parliaments for the decisions and assessments made. They are also not politically obligated to explain to the public the reasons and details of their decisions and choices. Finally, the plurality of the initiatives of Track Two Diplomacy may cause conflict and distraction, especially if there is a lack of coordination between these initiatives.
Examples
In 1994, a war nearly erupted between the United States and Haiti after the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing member states to use force to ensure Haiti’s compliance with previous United Nations resolutions. The resolution called for the restoration of a constitutional government after a coup d’état that had taken place years prior. This ordeal resulted in a tense period between the United States and Haiti and led to waves of migrants from Haiti towards the United States.
In July 1994, after all diplomatic options had been exhausted, the Clinton administration offered the Haitian military a stark warning. However, before further escalation, former US President Jimmy Carter was able to effectively mediate the conflict. According to his memoirs and another report by the American RAND Corporation, President Carter’s mediation with the Haitian military led to the diffusion of the crisis and avoided a military confrontation that many considered imminent. Following that mediation, a multinational force arrived in Haiti and restored stability to the country. After leaving the White House, Carter founded the Carter Center as a non-governmental, non-partisan organization in 1982, in partnership with Emory University. During the nineties, the Carter Center played an active role in mediating several conflicts around the world using Track Two and Track One and Half Diplomacy.
Similarly, a number of studies have revealed that Track Two Diplomacy has been used in several regions in Africa in the 1990s and into the new millennium, including Mozambique, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Senegal, and Tunisia. These examples involved the participation of non-state actors such as religious leaders, youth leaders, influential businessmen, and local and international NGOs. The implementation of Track Two Diplomacy helped restore calm between opponents, address the concerns of the affected communities, facilitated the achievement of justice for individuals in society, and facilitated democratic transitions. It also helped reduce the potential of civil wars from occuring by opening and improving channels of communication and changed how conflicting parties perceived each other.
Furthermore, Track Two Diplomacy helped restore relations between countries through building trust between entities, offering new opportunities for negotiation, and changing conflict dynamics by strengthening voices of moderation. In Kenya, notable conflicts that have involved the use of Track Two Diplomacy include the post-election violence in 2007-2008, violence in 2017, conflicts between pastoral communities in Baringo and Turkana, and border conflicts with Somalia.