During 2022, the Middle East was the subject of significant interest from several world powers. This was related to the Russian-Ukrainian war, and its repercussions on energy prices, and the world economy, which was gradually recovering from the repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic.US and European sanctions on Russian energy exports led to an intense effort to find alternative sources, which brought the Middle East into play.
Interest in the region was not limited to the US and Europe; Russia and China also moved to consolidate their owninfluence in the Middle East. They worked to establish partnerships with various countries in the region, including allies of the US. Competition between these world powers was illustrated by the large number of high-level visits to the region in the second half of 2022.
US President Joe Biden visited the Middle East from July 13 to 16, 2022, eighteen months after he was sworn in on January 20, 2021. This was followed by a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the 19th of the same month to Iran.Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia December7-10 , during which times he held summits not only with the Saudi leaders, but also with those of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as a summit with Arab leaders as a whole.
The interest of global powers in the Middle East , and their engagement with the region during 2023, is likely to reflect their own domestic concerns. In the case of the US, the results of the mid-term congress elections suggest that the Biden Administration will be preoccupied fending off pressures from the Republicans, who will strive to obstruct the administration’s legislative agenda. Preparations for the presidential elections that will take place in 2024 will also put the focus more intensely on domestic issues.
US engagement with regional issues is therefore likely to be limited. The National Security Strategy of the US administration, issued on October 12, as well as the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2023, revealed a modest interest in the Middle East, with a nod to traditional US commitments to support allies in the region, enhance their capabilities to confront terrorist organizations, and to deter and confront Iran in the Middle East. The US is also committed to preventing any regional or world power fromthreatening the security of navigation in the region, especiallythrough the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, and to retaliate for any attacks on US military personnel or civilian citizens.
It is likely that the US, as well as the EU, will halt attempts toreach a nuclear agreement with Iran, in view of domestic opposition in the US, as well as Iran’s involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war, by providing military support to Russia, and what the West perceives to be Iran’s unwillingness to reach agreement .
On the other hand, the US is likely to continue in its efforts to undermine terrorist organizations in the region, especially “Al-Qaeda”, “ISIS” and “Shabab Al-Mujahideen” in Somalia. The US strategy in this respect has three main pillars, the firstof which is that US forces will not engage in ground combat with militant forces. Rather, the US will provide training, as well as technical and intelligence support to the military and security forces in countries where terrorist organizations are active and provide them with military aid. The third pillar of the US strategy is to target terrorist leaders through airstrikes, as well as undergoing swift and focused strikes on areas where terrorists are gathered, with a care to minimizing harm to civilians.
China, on the other hand, is likely to focus on fosteringeconomic cooperation. This was illustrated by the number of deals concluded during the Chinese President’s visit to the region. Arab energy imports are extremely important to China, and it is the leading trade partner to many Arab countries. Moreover, the region’s location is strategically important to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
It is expected that China will seek to spread its “soft power” in the region, as well as enhancing security and military cooperation with a number of regional countries. Regarding economic cooperation, China is likely to focus on partnerships in promising economic fields such as renewable energy, fifth generation technology, and space. China’s role in the region will no doubt be impacted, however, by domestic challenges, especially regarding its slowing economy, as well as rising tensions with the US.
Europe is also likely to enhance its engagement in the region, particularly its efforts to diffuse the multiple regional crises.This was illustrated by French President Emmanuel Macron’sparticipation in the “Baghdad 2” summit, held in the Jordanian capital, Amman December 20, to support security and stability in Iraq. European efforts in general to diffuse regional crises are in part related to securing energy needs, with the Middle East now becoming a major candidate to replace supplies from Russia.
There have been numerous high level European visits to the region, with energy on the agenda. It is expected that European interest in partnerships with Arab countries will continue, both in terms of encouraging them to increase production, and supporting new partnerships in renewable energy.
Russia continues its efforts to Expand Influence in the Middle East, to counter US efforts to isolate it on the international scene. Russia has worked to strengthen its relations with countries in the region, who though allied to the US in the region, have refused to submit to US demands to punish Moscow. Most Middle Eastern countries chose to remain neutral in the crisis, with some engaging in mediation efforts, such as brokering a deal to allow the flow of grain exports, as well as prisoner exchanges. Iran remains the only country that chose to support Russia militarily during the war.
Whatever trajectory the war in Ukraine takes, Russia is likely to seek to expand its footprint in the Middle East, beyond its military presence in Syria. Russia is expanding the scope of military cooperation with Iran, which may become, according to the Washington Post, a “broad defense partnership”. In addition, Russia will seek to an increase its arms sales to countries the US imposes restrictions on.
Overall, international powers are likely to prioritize thehumanitarian dimension of crises in the region, even as they refuse to invest additional resources in settling regionalconflicts. Humanitarian aid is likely to be directed at “failed states”, especially as they have become drivers of illegal migrations as well as a safe haven for terrorist organizations.
Western support is likely to be directed towards mitigating the effect of climate change, in view of US and European pledges during the Climate Conference (COP 27), as well as to food security in countries adversely affected in that respect by the Russian-Ukrainian war. There are fears that deterioration economic conditions could impact the political stability of these countries.
Growing international competition in the Middle East provides an opportunity for regional countries to maneuver, hedging against the repercussions of possible shifts in US policy towards the region, and exertingpressure on the US to pay greater attention to regionalsecurity concerns. At the same time, maintaining a balance will be challenging, as regional countries need to avoid taking sides in a manner detrimental to their own interest.