Russia has reopened its embassy in Tripoli, signaling Moscow’s desire to keep channels open to all parties of the Libyan conflict to ensure that its interests are preserved. Russia’s good relationship with Fathi Bashagha, head of the Libyan government elected by the Council of Representatives in eastern Libya, offers a number of benefits, including: opening strategic channels of communication, involving Russia as a mediator among Libyan factions, using Libyan relations as leverage on the international scene, improving Russia’s economic and political ties with Libya, and securing a foothold to employ in Russia’s ongoing confrontation with the West. 

On 20 September 2022, Russia’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mikhail Bogdanov, revealed to Russian media his country’s intentions to resume the work of the Russian embassy in the Libyan capital Tripoli, which was closed in 2014 and is now under the control of the Debeibah government. Russian President Vladimir Putin has approved the credentials of the Libyan Ambassador to Moscow, Emad al-Maghrawi, and has declared that his country was striving to resolve the conflict in Libya, acting on various levels within an international system that is heading towards multipolarity. El Maghrawi is expected to begin his work in early October.

At the same time, Russia is currently considering opening a consulate in the eastern city of Benghazi. The head of the Russian foreign ministry’s MENA region, Alexander Kinschak, announced in early September 2022, that Moscow plans to open a general consulate in Benghazi after reopening its embassy in Tripoli, explaining that, “Russia does not support conflict in Libya, and is willing to initiate contact with all Libyan power centers.”

In the context of escalating tensions between parties to the conflict in Libya, and the efforts of some regional and international forces to mediate, Russia’s move to strengthen its role in Libya at this particular time carries the following implications:

Opening Russian channels of communication with Dbeibeh to achieve  strategic interests: After a long absence from the Libyan scene, Moscow recently realized that  the Government of National Unity, headed by Abdul Hamid Al-Dbeibeh, enjoyed international and regional support, as the Bashaga government, which was supported by Moscow over the past period,  failed to take control of Tripoli.  Therefore, President Putin found it necessary for his country to establish links to all parties to the Libyan conflict, including the Dbeibeh government, whose militia have succeeded in securing several victories over the western Libyan brigades, resulting in the failure of Bashaga to capture Tripoli.

This means that it has proven difficult to dislodge Dbeibeh’s Government of National Unity, either militarily or  politically, and Russia will therefore have to adjust to the facts on the ground to ensure its own strategic interests, especially as Libya has a significant role to play in the global energy market. Libya is Africa’s second largest oil exporter, with exports rising to about 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2021, and its exports have become more important in view of Western sanctions on Russian oil. Moscow’s move towards initiating relations with the Dbeibah government, which controls oil revenues, aims to strengthen Russian standing concerning Libya’s oil and gas, giving it the ability to influence Libya’s oil supply and exports to the West.

Russian efforts to mediate between Libyan factions: Moscow’s improved relationship with the Dbeibah government opens channels of diplomatic communication that may enable it to play a mediating role between Libyan factions in the coming period. Russia has expressed its assurances that its links with western Libya would not undermine its relations with the government in the east. It appears that Moscow is inclined to reach out to Aqeela Saleh, who is preparing for a forthcoming visit to Moscow, to play a role, either to lead mediation efforts, or to form a third government. This comes after the Libyan people have expressed growing discontent with the existence of both governments, and their inability to address Libya’s growing domestic problems. The Russian government also maintained contacts with some supporters of the former Libyan regime and have provided them with logistical support. Moscow’s efforts appear aimed at countering Turkey’s expanded influence, and to establish itself as the major player in Libyan conflict.

Using Libya as leverage on the international scene: President Putin has lately focused on intensifying Russian presence in African countries, especially Libya, to counter Western efforts to isolate Russia on the international scene. Libya may therefore prove useful, given its potential to provide significant leverage, with influence over Libyan energy sources Europe hopes to tap as an alternative to Russian energy. Moscow hopes to thwart attempts by EU leaders to invest in Libya’s energy infrastructure to reduce dependence on Russian gas, which would exacerbate Europe’s imminent gas supply crisis next winter. Russia could, through the militias it supports in Libya, pose a threat for NATO countries. The Kremlin has, over the past years, worked to become an invincible player in Libya through private security companies, especially Wagner in east Libya. Moscow’s attempt to integrate Wagner into the security structure of the Libyan National Army (LNA) also aims at undermining European interests.

Establishing  military footholds in Libya: After Wagner’s attempts to support the takeover of Tripoli by the LNA commander Khalifa Haftar failed, Moscow is trying to find other footholds in Libya. Wagner forces have been redeployed fortifying their position to resist attacks from Western and Turkish Libyan forces on behalf of the LNA. Despite Moscow’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine, Wagner recently returned some 5,000 troops to Libya, and has established a presence near Libya’s most strategic production and export facilities.

This comes amid Russia’s ongoing attempts to control oil installations and nearby military bases in central Libya and its southwestern regions. In July 2020, Russia successfully controlled a network of military and air bases from Qordabiya near Sirte to Brak near Sabha, bringing Russian MiG-29 and SU-24 fighter jets. Russia now therefore wishes to establish a presence in western Libya, hence the diplomatic return to Tripoli and improved relations with the Dbeibah government. This may realize the Kremlin’s objective of establishing Russian military bases on Libyan territory, thereby giving it a permanent presence on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Thus, Moscow would be able to use its military presence in both Syria and Libya in any confrontations with the West.

Reestablishing Russia’s economic and political influence in Libya: Moscow aims to e restore the status it enjoyed under the late Libyan President Muammar al-Qadhafi. Al-Qadhafi, which had extended to all economic, investment, social and political fields. Aqeela Saleh’s visit to Moscow, therefore, plays into Russia’s efforts to reestablish political influence. 

With regard to economic interests, Russia wants to compensate for its losses as a result of the Western sanctions by expanding its economic ties and investments in Libya. Indeed, in his speech welcoming the new Libyan ambassador, President Putin alluded to Russia’s hopes for the resumption of bilateral cooperation between the two countries in various areas, as the situation in Libya stabilizes.

In conclusion, the attempts by various international and regional parties to extend their influence in Libya under the guise of mediation efforts to end the conflict there have prompted Russia to act swiftly to restore its influence on the Libyan scene. Russia is likely to intensify its efforts on all levels in this respect in the near future, extending support to all the contending parties within Libya in order to safeguard its own interests and prevent any other power from dislodging Moscow’s influence there.